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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENT DISMISSED WHERE
LLEGAL EVIDENCE INFLUENCED GRAND JURY
Witnesses before a grand jury stated opinions and assump-
tions which were prejudicial to defendant and illegal. Held (3-2):
Indictment dismissed on defendant's motion. Where the suffi-
ciency of all the evidence to support the indictment is a close ques-
tion, the receipt of some illegal evidence likely to have influenced
the grand jury will invalidate the indictment. People v. Leary,
280 App. Div. 679, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 392 (3d Dep't 1952).
N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 313, enacted in 1881, stated that an
"indictment must be set aside by the court in which defendant was
arraigned, and upon his motion, in either of the following cases,"
viz., where not found by twelve jurors, not endorsed a true bill and
signed by the foreman, or not presented in court in the presence
of the jurors and filed by the clerk, or where a stranger has been
present during sessions of the grand jury. After 1881, the courts
dismissed indictments for reasons other than those stated in § 313.
See, e. g., People v. Clark, 8 N. Y. Crim. R. 169, 14 N. Y. Supp. 642
(Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1891) ; People v. Brickner, 8 N. Y. Crim. R. 217,
15 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1891) (insufficient evidence);
People v. Moore, 65 How. Pr. 177 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1883) (incom-
petent testimony); People v. Sellick, 4 N. Y. Crim. R. 329 (Ct. of
Sess. 1886) (illegal evidence) ; People v. Singer, 5 N. Y. Crim. R. 1
(Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1886) (defendant compelled to testify against
himself).
The tendency of the courts to disregard the limitations of
§ 313 apparently attracted the attention of the legislature, which
amended 4313 in 1897 by adding to the phrase, "in either of the
following cases," the words "but in no other." At first, the addi-
tional phrase was generally interpreted to negative the judicial
power to dismiss indictments for other grounds on defendant's
motion. People v. Rutherford, 47 App. Div. 209, 62 N. Y. Supp.
224 (3d Dep 't 1900) ; People v. O'Connor, 31 Misc. 668, 66 N. Y.
Supp. 126 (Co. Ct. 1900) ; People v. Scannell, 37 Misc. 345, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 500 (Gen. Sess. 1902). However, notwithstanding § 313,
courts have since continued to dismiss indictments for uncorrobo-
rated testimony, People v. Argo, 259 App. Div. 1091, 21 N. Y. S. 2d
289 (2d Dep't 1940) ; People v. Nitzberg, 289 N. Y. 523, 47 N. E. 2d
37 (1943); for insufficient evidence, People v. Sylvester, 149 Misc.
138, 267 N.Y. Supp. 399 (Gen. Sess. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 861,
271 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (1st Dep't 1934) ; for illegal evidence, People
v. Nicosia, 164 Misc. 152, 298 N. Y. Supp. 591 (Co. Ct. 1937); Peo-
ple v. Levis, 96 Misc. 513, 161 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Gen. Sess. 1916) ;
where defendant was indicted upon his own testimony without
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waiving immunity, People v. Baumer, 136 Misc. 17, 241 N. Y. Supp.
733 (Sup. Ct. 1930); and where defendant was compelled to testify
against himself, People v. Macner, 171 Misc. 720, 13 N. Y. S. 2d
451 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
Two theories might be advanced to explain the dismissal of
indictments on defendant's motion, on grounds not enumerated in
§ 313:
(1) Protection of defendant's constitutional rights. Defend-
ant has a right to an indictment by a grand jury. N. Y. CoNsT.
Art. I, § 6. In upholding an indictment where some illegal evi-
dence was received, the Court of Appeals asserted by way of
dictum that the judiciary has the power to dismiss indictments in
order to protect defendant's constitutional rights, without defin-
ing the extent of such rights. People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 400,
66 N. E. 112, 114 (1903). A later dictum indicated the constitu-
tional right reaches two cases: where the evidence is clearly in-
sufficient or where illegal evidence is the sole basis of the indict-
ment. People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 511, 80 N. E. 396, 402
(1907).
(2) The grand jury can receive none but legal evidence. N.
Y. CODE CRLM. PROC. § 256. The Code does not express the effect
of receipt of illegal evidence. Furthermore, indictments have not
been dismissed for receipt of illegal evidence where sustained by
sufficient legal evidence. People v. Rabinowitz, 277 App. Div. 793,
97 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (2d Dep't 1950), aff'd, 301 N. Y. 763, 95 N. E.
2d 825 (1950) ; People v. Smith, 258 App. Div. 800 (2d Dep't 1939) ;
People v. Grout, 174 App. Div. 608, 166 N. Y. Supp. 718 (2d Dep't
1916).
Neither of the above theories, whatever their validity, sus-
tains the instant case. The evidence received was neither clearly
insufficient nor solely illegal, nor was the sufficiency of the evidence
determined. The majority opinion conceded the sufficiency of the
evidence was a close question, People v. Leary, supra at 680-681,
117 N. Y. S. 2d 392; 394, but invalidated the indictment because
illegal evidence "must have influenced the deliberations of the
Grand Jury." This would appear to be an extension of the law
since the court dismissed the indictment without having deter-
mined the basic question, the sufficiency of the evidence.
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